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TREASURE ALICE ARENS; as Administratrix, etc., Peti-
tioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNAR-
DINO COUNTY, Respondent; MAUDE H. McLAREN, 
Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Probate Homesteads-Appeal.-An order 
setting aside a probate homestead is appealable and becomes 
final when the time for appeal expires (Prob. Code, § 1240) 
whether or not it is in excess of the court's jurisdiction. 
[2] Id.-Probate Homesteads-Oertiorari.-Certiorari does not lie 
to review an order setting aside a probate homestead, since the 
writ can issue only when there is no appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1068.) 
[3] Id. - Probate Homesteads - Oertiorari-Although an order 
denying a motion to vacate a prior order setting aside a pro-
bate homestead is not appealable, review of that order would 
require a review of the order to be vacated, and the appeal-
ability of the latter prevents a review thereof by certiorari. 
[4] Id.-Probate Homesteads-Oertiorari.-The mere fact that 
decedent's daughter received no notice of a petition filed on 
behalf of the widow praying that a probate homestead be set 
aside to her or of the court's order did not preclude the daugh-
ter from appealing, so as to make certiorari an available 
remedy, since Prob. Code § 1200, prescribing the form of 
notice to be given on a petition to set apart a probate home-
stead, does not require actual notice, and a compliance with its 
terms makes the order conclusive on all persons. 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the 
Superior Court of San Bernardino County denying a motion 
to vacate an order setting apart a probate homestead. Pro-
ceeding dismissed. 
Krag & Sweet and Donald R. Krag for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Lonergan & Jordan and A. M. Sessions for Real Party in 
Interest. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 86 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 428; [2-4] De-
cedents' Estates, § 428.1. 
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TRA YNOR, J .-On :March 7, 1951, approximately 19 years 
after the <.leath of Chauncey L. Hartman, a verified petition 
was filed in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County 
Oll behalf of his widow, Nellie May Hartman, by her son-
in-law, Charles R. McLaren, alleging that the decedent had 
an undivided two-thirds interest in certain real property 
of the value of $4,075 and that the widow had an undivided 
one-third interest therein. The petition prayed that the real 
property be set apart to the widow "for her lifetime, as a 
probate homestea<.l, and for such other relief as may be proper 
in the premises." 
On April 18, 1951. the court entered the following order: . 
"The verified petition of CHAS. R. McLAREN for an order 
setting apart a homestead under the provisions of Sections 
660 and 661 of the Probate Code, heretofore filed in this 
Court, came on regularly to be heard this 23rd day of March, 
1951; it appears to the satisfaction of the Court, and the 
Court finds, that notice of the hearing on said petition has 
been regularly given in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 1200 of the Probate Code; and the Court having 
heard the evidence, it appearing therefrom that the allega-
tions in the petition are true and that at the time of decedent's 
death, Nellie May Hartman, the surviving widow, was a 
member of decedent's family, and it having been duly made 
to appear to the Court that no homestead had been selected 
during the lifetime of the decedent, and it further appearing 
the property hereinafter described was owned, as to an un-
divided one-third interest, by Nellie May Hartman, the sur-
viving widow of decedent, as her separate property, and as 
to the remaining two-thirds interest by decedent, as his sepa-
rate property, and that said real property should be set aside 
to the surviving widow. 
"I T Is HEREBY ORDERED that the land described as follows, 
to wit: [description omitted] . . . be and the same is hereby 
set apart to NELLIE MAY HARTMAN, the widow of decedent, 
as a homestead for the use of Nellie May Hartman, and that 
said real property so set aside shall vest absolutely in and 
belong to her." 
On February 3, 1952, Nellie May Hartman died leaving 
a will in which she sought to devise the real property to her 
daughter, Maude H. McLaren. On September 7, 1954, peti-
tioner herein, rrreasure Alice Arens, the daughter of de-
cedent Chauncey L. Hartman, noticed a motion to vacate 
the order of April 18, 1951, setting apart the probate home-
) 
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stead absolutely to Nellie May Hartman, on the grounds that 
the relief granted was in excess of that prayed for (see 
Burtnett v. King, 33 Ca1.2d 805 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.2d 
333]) and that under Probate Code, section 661, the court 
acted in excess of its jurisdiction in setting apart the probate 
homestead to Nellie May Hartman absolutely instead of for 
life. After a hearing the court on September 23, 1954, denied 
the motion on the grounds that "it appears from the record 
that since no requests for notice were filed, the notice as 
given was legally adequate" and that "petitioners' remedy 
was a timely appeal from the Order made." Petitioner seeks 
a writ of certiorari to review the order denying the motion 
to vacate the order setting apart the probate homestead. 
[1] The order setting aside the probate homestead was an 
appealable order and became final when the time for appeal 
expired (Prob. Code, § 1240) whether or not it was in excess 
of the jurisdiction of the court. (Phelan v. Superior Court, 
35 Cal.2d 363, 366 [217 P .2d 951].) [2] Certiorari does not 
lie to review that order, for the writ can issue only when 
"there is no appeal." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068.) [3] Nor 
can this rule be avoided by means of a motion to vacate 
the order. Although the order denying the motion to 
vacate is not appealable (Kramer v. Superior Court, 36 Ca1.2d 
159, 161 [222 P.2d 874]), review of that order would require 
a review of the order to be vacated, and the appealability of 
the latter prevents a review thereof by certiorari. 
[4] Petitioner contends, however, that she could not appeal 
from the order setting apart the probate homestead because 
she received no notice of the petition filed by Charles R. 
McLaren or of the order made pursuant thereto, and that 
therefore certiorari is an available remedy. (See Grinbaum 
v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 528, 556 [221 P. 635].) It is 
immaterial that petitioner received no actual notice of the 
petition or of the court's order. Section 1200 of the Probate 
Code, which prescribes the form of notice to be given upon 
a petition to set apart a probate homestead, does not require 
actual notice. It provides, however, for special notice to 
be given to persons requesting it at their post office address 
given in the request for special notice. Petitioner made no 
such request. Section 1200 also provides: ' 'Proof of the 
giving of notice must be made at the hearing; and'if it 
appears to the satisfaction of the court that said notice has 
been regularly given, the court shall so find in its order, 
and such order, when it becomes fina] , shall be conclusive 
) 
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on all persons." Since the order of April 18, 1951, quoted 
above, shows that the foregoing conditions were met, the 
order is "conclusive on all persons." Since no such statutory 
provision was involved in Grinbau,m v. Superior Oourt, supra, 
and since the record therein affirmatively showed that the re· 
quired notice was not given, an exception to the rule pre-
scribed by section 1068 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot 
be made under the authority of that case. 
Since it is clear that certiorari does not lie, we do not 
reach the question whether or not the order of April 18, 1951, 
was in excess of the court's jurisdiction. 
The proceeding is dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In my opinion the trial court 
was without power to grant relief which exceeded that au-
thorized by statute (Prob. Code, § 661), requested in the 
petition for order to set apart probate homestead, and desig-
nated in the notice of hearing on the petition as the relief 
sought. Furthermore, it is my opinion that the writ of cer-
tiorari should be available to Treasure Alice Arens for the 
reason that she lost her right to appeal from the order 
setting aside the homestead without fault on her part because 
she had no actual notice of the making of such order, and 
even if she had received actual notice she would have had 
no reason to anticipate that she should appear to oppose the 
granting of relief in excess of that prayed for and statutorily 
authorized. 
The real property in question was acquired by decedent 
Chauncey L. Hartman by purchase prior to his marriage to 
Nellie May Hartman; from this it would appear to have been 
wholly his separate property. However, the order which pur-
ports to set it aside absolutely to Nellie May Hartman 
states that it appears that such property "was owned, as 
to an undivided one-third interest, by Nellie May Hartman, 
the surviving widow of decedent, as her separate property. 
and as to the remaining two-thirds interest by decedent, as 
his separate property." This language substantially follows 
language of the petition for an order to set apart a home. 
stead. It is apparently based upon a will of decedent which 
was filed with a petition for letters of administration but 
was not pl'obated because proof of the signatures of the sub-
) 
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scribing witnesses could not be obtained. The will stated that 
Chauncey L. Hartman and Nellie May Hartman had mutually 
agreed that he owned a two-thirds interest in the realty as his 
separate property and she owned a one-third interest as her 
separate property; it purported to devise decedent's two-
thirds interest to Nellie May for life with remainder to de-
cedent's two children, Treasure Alice and Donald. 
The petition for order setting apart a probate homestead 
prays that the order set apart the property to Nellie May 
Hartman "for her lifetime." In the notice of hearing the 
relief prayed for is not stated but the "petition is hereby 
referred to for further particulars." The order finds "that 
notice of the hearing on said petition has been regularly 
given" (italics added). Yet the superior court proceeded to 
order that the real property "shall vest absolutely in and 
belong to" Nellie May Hartman. 
Whether the decedent owned the entire fee in the real 
property or a two-thirds interest as his separate property, 
the probate court was authorized by statute to set it aside 
only for a limited period not exceeding the lifetime of the 
widow. Section 661 of the Probate Code provides, in ma-
terial part, that the court must select a homestead "out of 
the community property or out of real property owned in 
common by the decedent and the person or persons entitled 
to have the homestead set apart, or if there be no community 
property and no such property owned in common, then out 
of the separate property of the decedent. If the property 
set apart is the separate property of the decedent, the court 
can set it apart only for a limited period, to be designated 
in the order, and in no case beyond the lifetime of the sur-
viving spouse. . . ." Under this section the separate prop-
erty interest of a decedent, whether it be the entire ownership 
of the property or an interest in common with the survivor 
entitled to the homestead, can be set apart for a limited time 
only. (Estate of Maxwell (1935), 7 Cal.App.2d 641, 642 [46 
P.2d777] .) 
It has been stated and held that an order setting aside 
absolutely a probate homestead to a widow from separate 
property of the deceased husband, although erroneous, is not 
void. (Estate of Bette (1915), 171 Cal. 583, 585-586 [153 
P. 949] ; Estate of Huelsman (1899), 127 Cal. 275, 2~6 [59 
P. 776] ; In re Moore (1892), 96 Cal. 522, 531 [31 P. 584] ; 
Fergodo v. Donohue (1919), 40 Cal.App. 670, 671 (181 P. 
819] ; see also Estate of Burns (1880), 54 Cal. 223, 227-228; 
... 
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/(ountree v. Montague (1916), 30 CaLApp. 170, 176-178 [157 
P. 623].) The foregoing cases, however, did not concern all 
attack by certiorari upon the order setting apart the home-
stead, nor did they concern the effect of an order whicn 
granted relief in excess of that prayed for in the petition and 
designated in the notice as the relief which would be sought. 
For the purpose of determining the right to review by 
certiorari, action contrary to that authorized by statute (here. 
the granting of relief in excess of that authorized by Probe 
Code, § 661) is action in excess of jurisdiction. (See, e.g., 
Burtnett v. King (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 805, 807 [205 P.2d 656. 
12 A.L.R.2d 333]; Abellci1'a v. District Court of Appeal 
(1941), 17 Ca1.2d 280, 288 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] ; 
Rodman V. Superior Court (1939), 13 Ca1.2d 262, 270 [89 
P.2d 109].) Furthermore, in a proceeding instituted in the 
probate court by statutorily authorized posted notice, where 
interested persons have no actual notice, policy should demand 
that the relief granted cannot exceed that which, according 
to the notice, will be sought. Such policy is analogous to that 
which underlies the rule that in civil default actions a decree 
which grants relief in excess of that prayed for exceeds the 
court's jurisdiction and is void. (Burtnett v. King (1949), 
supra, 33 Ca1.2d 805, 808.) 
I agree with petitioner's contention that, despite the theo-
retical availability of the remedy of appeal, certiorari should 
be available because without any fault on her part she had 
no actual knowledge of the proceeding to set apart the home-
stead and therefore could not appeal. (Grinbaum V. Superior 
Court (1923), 192 Cal. 528, 556 [221 P. 635] ; see also Lee 
v. Small Claims Court (1939), 34 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [92 P.2d 
937] ,and cases there cited [the statute which resulted in 
a situation where the time for appeal from the judgment of 
the small claims court might well expire without defendant 
having notice of entry of judgment against him has been 
since amended (Code Civ. Proc., § 117j; Am. Stats, 1951, ch. 
1143, p. 2912, § 1; Stats. 1951, ch. 1737, p. 4087, § 20; Stats. 
1955, ch. 566, § 1)].) 
For the foregoing reasons, I would annul the order of 
April 18, 1951, which sets apart the homestead absolutely. 
